Decades on the Edge of the Abyss:
Competing Incentives Prevent Reforms in Cuba
Erik Hamel
GOVT-450: Politics in Cuba
Professor William LeoGrande
Abstract
This research paper aims to address the successes and failures of the reform program created by President Raúl Castro between 2011 and the end of his presidency in 2018 as a function of competing incentives for the Cuban government. It introduces reforms and their removal in the Special Period as a case study in the thinking of the government. It examines where the 313 guidelines were implemented or not. By tracing the rollback of Special Period reforms, the design of the 313 guidelines approved in 2011, their successes and failures, and the constraints on Cuba’s leaders, this paper argues that the 313 reforms proposed by President Raúl Castro and approved in 2011 were not fully implemented because of competing incentives: (a) a desire not to harm or anger Cubans with difficult reforms, (b) institutional self-preservation, and, relatedly, (c) fears about a slide towards capitalism.
Key words: Cuba, reform, guidelines, Lineamientos, Special Period, Castro, Díaz-Canel
Reforms and Their Removal in The Special Period
The reforms created and removed during the Special Period are necessary context for the thinking of the Cuban government. Cuba lost its largest trading partner and benefactor when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Because of declining aid from the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro spoke in 1990 of a “special period in times of peace,” in contrast to a special period in times of war where a country is cut off from its neighbors by an enemy. Castro said to the Federation of Cuban Women, “It would bring us a special period in times of peace if very serious problems arise in the USSR and we cannot receive the supplies that we are getting from the USSR,” especially while Cuba’s development required 12 million tons of imported oil (Cederlöf 2023, 84). This term and this speech signaled “a national emergency occurring in peacetime but with potential consequences for the survival of the regime as serious as those of a war” (Pérez-López 2002, 507).
Castro was proven right: between 1989 and 1993, trade with the former Soviet Union fell by over 90% (Pérez n.d.). Cuba lost 40% of its internationally valid currency when it could no longer sell discounted Soviet oil on the world market (Pérez-López and Díaz-Briquets 2005, cited in Cuba Platform n.d.b); the average Cuban lost five to six kilograms of bodyweight (Franco et al. 2008); fifty thousand people went temporarily blind due to vitamin insufficiencies (Ordúñez-García et al. 1996); improvements in infant mortality reversed (Ministerio de Salud Publica 2006).
To alleviate the worst of the crisis, Cuba legalized the collection and use of US dollars in 1993, although many Cubans already collected dollars secretly to protect themselves against inflation (González-Corzo 2006). Dollarization was legalized to stimulate remittances from the United States to give Cuba more international currency (González-Corzo 2006). Cuba also “amended the Constitution to allow new forms of private and corporate property, regulate foreign investment, [and] turn state companies into for‑profit enterprises” (Cuba Platform n.d.).
In 1994, the government created a dual currency system with the Cuban peso (CUP) and the Cuban convertible peso (CUC). Rather than a variable exchange rate, the convertible peso was officially linked to the US dollar at a ratio of one to one, though the rate was far above that on the black market. This dual currency system exacerbated inflation by requiring the government to print money to pay the difference between the official and real exchange rate (Vidal and Luis 2023).
The dual currency system made foreign direct investment easier for foreign companies because the convertible peso was used only in tourism. This was done to limit the negative effect foreign investment would have on Cuban pesos (Simoni 2016, 40). However, even as tourism expanded as an industry to entice US dollars, the Cuban government tried to minimize the contact that tourists had with the local population by funneling them into all-inclusive resorts (Colatino and Potter 2006, 122, cited in Simoni 2016, 40). The dual currency system and emphasis on tourism also worsened inequality by making people rely even more on dollars, which were not available to many workers. For example, hotel workers often made more money than people in government jobs because tips were paid in convertible pesos (Uriarte 2008, 286).
The government also legalized self employment, cuentapropismo, and granted 210,000 licenses to entrepreneurs by 1995, though license holders could not hire non-relatives (Gonzalez 1996). Paladares, for example, are common family-run restaurants allowed a maximum seating capacity of twelve in 1995 (Scarpaci Jr. 1995).
The Battle of Ideas and Initial Rollbacks
In 2003, thirteen years into the Special Period, Fidel Castro launched the “Battle of Ideas” campaign to reestablish the role of the state. Cuba recentralized “all economic decision-making, unlinked the economy from the US dollar, created a single account at the Cuban Central Bank for depositing all foreign currencies and trimmed the country’s small private sector” (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2005, cited in Mesa-Lago 2008). The Battle of Ideas began explicitly to retake control of Cuba as a socialist nation after ceding too much power to capitalist ideas (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2005).
The rollback of helpful measures in the Special Period is indicative of a continued but less extreme trend at the highest levels of the Cuban government, which seeks to stay committed to Cuba’s original socialist model while providing the best results for its people and so implements only partial reforms when absolutely necessary. The incentive for Cuban leaders is evident from both a lens of ideology and a lens of power. Cuban government officials may genuinely believe that socialism is the ideal form of government and that adopting capitalist reforms is a slippery slope that will eventually make the country beholden to the United States. More selfishly, they also know that their own careers and livelihoods depend on preserving Cuba’s political system, and that allowing private enterprises to take more control is a threat to their power. These are some reasons Raúl Castro’s later reforms were not fully adopted.
Design and Goals of the 2011 Reforms
When Raúl Castro came into power in 2006 after his elder brother Fidel retired, he had to lead Cuba after the implementation and removal of market reforms from the Special Period. At the 6th Communist Party Congress in 2010, President Raúl Castro submitted the Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución, meaning Economic and Social Policy Guidelines for the Party and the Revolution, often referred to as just the Lineamientos. The group of 313 guidelines are broken down into twelve categories across every area of Cuban society, often requiring drastic changes.
The twelve categories cover economic management, macroeconomics, external economics, investment, science and technology, social policy, agriculture, energy, tourism, transport, construction and housing, and commerce. This “updating” of the Cuban model was ambitious, but the first guideline reassured that “the socialist planning system will continue to be the principal means to direct the national economy” (Castro 2011a). Rather than being replaced by a capitalist system, socialist planning must be “transformed in its methodological and organisational aspects to accommodate new forms of management and guidance of the national economy” (Castro 2011c). Before the guidelines were passed, Castro told legislators, “we can either rectify the situation, or we will run out of time walking on the edge of the abyss, and we will sink” (Voss 2010). In that same speech, Raúl Castro cited quotes from Fidel to illustrate that even Fidel acknowledged the challenges of building and maintaining socialism, and that it is acceptable for the details of the system to change if the structure remains the same (Castro 2011c).
Raúl Castro also emphasized repeatedly that the government wanted to avoid “shock therapy” to the Cuban public, meaning drastic, immediate reforms (Castro 2011b). The inherent mismatch between Castro’s statements on the necessity of the reforms and his commitment to implementing them slowly again underscores the difficulty of maintaining the socialist model while trying to improve the lives of people in Cuba.
Successful Reforms Since 2011
Given Cuba’s current crisis, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the successful reforms have improved trends in the economy. Although only 21% of the 313 reforms had been implemented by 2016, there were some improvements in the areas they addressed, like consumer markets, self-employment, and agriculture (LeoGrande 2018).
Housing and Automotive Markets
In 2011, Cuba created a legal housing market to buy and sell homes; since 1959, families could pass on property to their children but not sell homes, so a complex black market emerged (BBC 2011). Housing was often extremely crowded because families could not easily move, so this reform was a relatively easy but partial solution to the long-standing problem of housing (BBC 2011). Similarly, Cubans were also allowed to privately buy and sell used cars beginning in 2011 (BBC 2014). After 2013, Cubans did not need state approval to buy new cars, though they were still only sold at government dealerships (BBC 2014). Loosening regulations on these markets did not undermine the power of the government.
Self-employment and Private Enterprises
One of the most significant reforms in recent years, and one not listed in the Lineamientos, is the legalization of micro, small, and medium enterprises, abbreviated MSMEs. Since their creation in 2021, these enterprises have been allowed to employ up to 10, 35, or 100 employees respectively. As of 2024, there were 11,000 MSMEs and 602,000 self-employed workers (McIntire and Herrero 2024). Using those numbers, “the non-agricultural private sector employs roughly one quarter of the island’s total labor force. Adding the non-state agricultural sector, the broadly defined ‘private’ share of the labor force is roughly one third” (McIntire and Herrero 2024). Paladares, family-run restaurants which account for many of the small businesses, were allowed up to twenty and then fifty seats, far beyond the original limit of twelve in 1995 (Taylor and Zuberi 2015).
Co-operatives and Agriculture
Cooperatives are organized groups of people who have pooled their resources together to operate more efficiently. Cooperativas de producción agropecuaria (CPAs), agricultural cooperatives, are “cooperatives formed by smallholders [small farms] who unite their lands in order to acquire inputs and produce collectively, combining their individual means of production for better yields” (Sylvia and Verburg n.d.).
In the Special Period, people and cooperatives were allowed to lease idle state land, a process called usufruct, in unidades básicas de producción cooperativa (UBPCs), meaning basic units of cooperative production. UBPCs are among the most important of the lasting successful reforms from the Special Period because they have allowed for cooperatives of state farmers to operate more independently and efficiently while still under the ownership of the state (Sylvia and Verburg n.d.). CPAs and UBPCs differ in that CPAs “were formed by small farmers pooling their lands” and UBPCs “were populated by former state farm workers, on lands still owned by the state, with open-ended, rent-free usufruct granted to the cooperative” (Royce 2004). In practice, this means that CPAs own their own land and UBPCs lease it in usufruct from the state, a more precarious arrangement. Private farms not part of CPAs have also expanded since 2008 but lease their land in a similar way to UBPCs (Alfonso and González 2023). Because of their increased autonomy and the ability to sell surplus food in markets, CPAs and private farms are more productive than state farms (Alfonso and González 2023).
The evidence suggests that Cuba is better off today than it would have been without any reforms. The legalization and growth of self-employment, MSMEs, and cooperatives account for much of this benefit. Nevertheless, the failures of most of the 313 Lineamientos far outweigh the successes.
Failed Reforms Since 2011
Between their approval and his exit from the presidency in 2018, President Raúl Castro’s list of 313 reforms were mostly not implemented, which did not reverse poor trends in Cuba’s economy. Some critics wrote at the time that many guidelines were “fairly obvious, trite and constitute general statements of reasonable economic management,” some of which had been “made repeatedly over a number of decades, including those relating to the expansion and diversification of exports, science and technology policy, [and] the sugar agro-industrial complex” (Pujol 2011). Reiterating existing goals did not guarantee that Cuba would implement them.
Among the reforms that stalled in the implementation phase were a renewed focus on exports and the end of subsidies to failing businesses, which still accounted for 20% of the state budget as of 2018 (Mesa-Lago 2017; LeoGrande 2018). Despite the previously mentioned reforms to agriculture, Cuba still does not produce enough food to meet domestic demand. Without agricultural production that can exceed internal demand or other industries that produce enough for exports, Cuba has become a services-driven economy (Spadoni 2023).
Remittances, Services, and Exports
The Lineamientos did not make Cuba shift away from remittances and reliance on services as a source of hard currency. For decades, Cuba has seen continuous success in the field of medicine because of robust and continued investment in schooling, despite difficulties obtaining the proper supplies. This has allowed them to maintain a comparable life expectancy and lower infant mortality than the United States for decades (Brønnum-Hansen et al. 2023; Main et al. 2026). Cuban medical professionals abroad accounted for $11 billion in revenue for Cuba in 2018 (Sánchez-Vallejo 2018). When exports of professional services like medicine, international tourism, and remittances are the main sources of hard currency, shocks to those fields can affect the country significantly (Spadoni 2023).
The Lineamientos also failed to develop Cuba’s industry and allow it to export goods. As of 2025, 1.6 million people in Cuba are privately employed (Fernandez 2025). While this growth from 157,000 in 2010 is extremely large, Cuba has not seen significant benefits because the industries are domestic and do not build Cuba’s industrial capacity for exports (Spadoni 2023).
Agriculture
Due to a mismanaged agricultural industry, Cuba must import 70 to 80% of its food (Oppenheimer 2024, cited in Center for a Free Cuba 2024). The agricultural reforms mentioned earlier greatly expanded the role of cooperatives and private farms, which now account for the majority of domestic food production, but they still produce far less than necessary because of a lack of resources (Havana Times 2025).
As of 2018, the state controlled 19.9% of farmland, UBPCs 30.2%, CPAs 9.8% and individual owners 40.1% (Botella-Rodríguez and González-Esteban 2021). Private individual farms were allowed shortly after the revolution, but the usufruct reforms allowed them to expand to that level (Alfonso and González 2023). The central planning of the economy means that state farms without market competition are not forced to be efficient or incentivized by the selling of their goods at market value. The expanded but still constrained autonomy of non-state farmers, and their inability to buy the materials necessary to farm, has prevented them from meeting domestic demand or exporting (Gonzalez-Corzo 2019).
Currency Unification and Fears of Shock Therapy
Unification of the Cuban peso and the Cuban convertible peso was in the approved 2011 Lineamientos, but it took until January 1st, 2021, “Day Zero,” for the measure to come into effect with the Tarea Ordenamiento, the reordering task (Yaffe 2021; Sotomayor 2023). Unifying the CUP and CUC and the simultaneous increases in wages unleashed inflation estimated between 174 and 700 percent (Vidal and Luis 2023). This sudden change and its lasting consequences underscore that the Cuban government is right to fear shock therapy, even when reform is necessary.
Under the dual currency system, fixed exchange rates “resulted in the marked overvaluation of the two currencies,” “created antiexport bias and distorted prices, and led to large compensatory transfers to firms and consumers (Vidal and Luis 2023). The new system was put in place abruptly alongside increases in the minimum wage and pensions (Vidal and Luis 2023).
Like the original rate of one convertible peso to one US dollar, the 2021 fixed exchange rate of 24 Cuban pesos for one US dollar is again not reflective of the reality in Cuba. On the black market, one US dollar is worth hundreds of pesos. This is a continued crisis for anyone paid in pesos. However, creating a floating exchange rate in 2021 or now would devalue the peso even further by forcing a rapid adjustment to the existing, black market rate without hard currency reserves for stability. The Central Bank of Cuba wrote in January 2026 that unification between dollars and pesos “‘can only be achieved gradually’” because a “‘sharp devaluation of the peso would have greater inflationary effects than those currently being experienced’” (Caribbean Council 2026).
Whether to classify currency unification as a failure or a success depends on whether one considers the concept or the method. Economists argue that currency unification was necessary conceptually because of the many problems that arose from the dual system; they also acknowledge that unifying the currencies in a “big bang” rather than gradually was painful for Cubans (Vidal and Luis 2023). For that reason, tens of thousands of Cubans protested in the July 11th, 2021 “11J” protests against inflation, shortages, and the government’s COVID-19 response (LeoGrande n.d.).
Current Crisis and Political Pressures
Raúl Castro and President Miguel Díaz-Canel, Castro’s successor since 2021, have faced substantial hurdles to ending crises in Cuba. Cuban leaders do not want to anger Cubans, lose too much of their power or control, or go too far into a capitalist model. The case of currency unification, while sudden, further illustrates the perennial problem for Cuban leadership. Cuba is frequently stuck between two difficult choices: implement necessary but unpopular and potentially capitalistic reforms or maintain the status quo so as not to make life worse for the public. Measures put in place in times of crisis—like the dual currency system in the Special Period—as well as the central planning model and lack of hard currency reserves are patterns that people adapt to and so they are difficult to remove.
While no people in power in Cuba today participated in the 1959 revolution, many people at the highest level and throughout the government are still “Fidelistas,” which made it difficult for Raúl Castro and now for Miguel Díaz-Canel to reform the economy (Corrales and Braseco 2021). Although other countries run by communist parties have seen success by adopting a mixed model, like China and Vietnam, there is more resistance in Cuba partially because of Fidel’s lasting influence. Simultaneously, unlike the only other planned economy in the world in North Korea, Cuba no longer has a major power to back it like the Soviet Union or China, and the state cannot afford to anger the people too severely without any way for them to protest, change the government, or emigrate. This dynamic has produced reforms when they are politically necessary, but the Cuban state is still resistant to widespread change because of genuine belief and self-preservation in the government. Soon into his term and while Cuba attempted to implement other reforms, “Díaz-Canel introduced a plethora of tough regulations in 2018 aimed at curtailing the growth of the self-employed” (Corrales and Braseco 2021).
Over-regulation and Reliance on the Planned Economy
Agricultural cooperatives are a key example of the push and pull of the state and markets: when private agriculture grows too powerful, the state reins it in. In the case of expanding cooperatives, there is not an obvious risk of widespread shocks or inflation because they are more productive than the state and could absorb publicly-employed farmers (Gonzalez-Corzo 2019). Slow progress in the development of cooperatives is therefore primarily a result of the Cuban government’s commitment to socialism and unwillingness to cede ground.
Similarly to regulations on cooperatives, paladares were allowed up to fifty seats but face regulations “drafted explicitly to curb the potential for high economic returns among paladar employees and owners” (Taylor and Zuberi 2015). High-end paladares openly defy the regulations because the benefit in patronage by tourists outweighs the risk of being shut down, which they can avoid by paying bribes; smaller paladares that follow the rules face the same taxation with no benefit, which creates a perverse incentive system (Taylor and Zuberi 2015). The Cuban government has little reason to overregulate paladares besides presenting the appearance of a planned economy that wealthy businesses circumvent.
Trying to downsize the planned economy by reducing subsidies to essential goods harms Cubans without access to hard currency who otherwise could not afford them (Colomé 2025). Many people rely on moneda libremente convertible (MLC) stores requiring hard currency to pay for basic goods (Perez Villanueva 2025). This is extremely significant for understanding the political pressure within Cuba. The social contract between any state and its people is that the state will tax them and provide necessary services. Under the Cuban model, the state must provide much more, including subsidies for basic goods to put them in reach of those with low state salaries. Even so, as of 2025, one Cuban person needs $100 USD a month to afford food, which is twenty times the monthly minimum wage (Colomé 2025). To further increase food prices by cutting subsidies is politically difficult at any time, let alone during a crisis. Even if the national debt needs to be paid urgently, the 11J protests confirm that Cubans will not passively accept subsidy cuts and immediate price hikes for the sake of national fiscal responsibility (LeoGrande n.d.).
Emigration to and Hostility of the United States
The Maleconazo protest in 1994 against the government temporarily led Fidel Castro to allow anyone to leave Cuba (Duany 2017). The elimination of the exit visa requirement in 2013 reestablished this policy (BBC 2012). The ability to emigrate and quickly become a US citizen served as a “safety valve” for the government, where the most unhappy people leave for the United States or Latin America instead of fomenting dissent against the government (Fernandez 2024). Under such an emigration policy, there is less pressure on the government to implement immediate reforms. The people most harmed by the current state of the country—people without access to hard currency or goods valuable on the black market—and the people who have family abroad are all more likely to leave (Duany 2017). Recent research shows that relatives abroad have largely shifted to sending Cuban relatives money for them to exit the country rather than support them enough to stay (Morales 2024).
Recently, the second Trump administration’s immigration policies have made it almost impossible for new Cuban immigrants to remain in the United States for at least a year, which is required by the Cuban Adjustment Act (Thurber 2020). Frequent changes in US policy under different US presidents also complicate Cuba’s attempts at reform. The ongoing blocking of oil to Cuba as part of President Trump’s “maximum pressure campaign,” more commonly called an oil blockade, has caused widespread power outages. These have harmed Cuban civilians, especially those needing medical care, and have worsened infant mortality (Augustin and Nicas 2026; Main et al. 2026). Under those conditions, the Cuban government has chosen to tighten control over the economy to protect itself and the economy rather than pursue potentially difficult reforms like they did with currency unification in 2021. Since the revolution in 1959, the goal of the United States has been to topple the communist regime, which now takes the form of keeping oil out of the country and keeping the people inside.
Conclusion
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuba has struggled to get its footing in a competitive global environment without billions of dollars in subsidies. To avoid famine, Cuba implemented market reforms in the so-called Special Period in Times of Peace between 1991 and 2006, when Fidel Castro stepped down as president. Many of the reforms were walked back towards the end of Fidel's presidency, which made the job of the newly-inaugurated President Raúl Castro difficult. A package of reforms in 2011 attempted to mitigate problems across Cuba but had only limited success. For decades, Cuban leadership has had to balance reforming the economy, address the needs of the public, and maintain their political power. Recently, intensified US policies have made that balancing act even more difficult.
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